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1. Introduction 
 
Prior studies have provided proof that firms conducting seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) do not only 
perform worse than their peers on the stock market after equity issues, but they also show 
deteriorating post-issue operating performance. Loughran and Ritter (1997) document a consistent 
fall in issuers operating performance immediately after SEOs in the United States during 1979-1989. 
This is reflected in low stock returns after high returns before the issue. The phenomenon has 
important macro-economic implications and it is closely connected to investor biases. The over-
optimism derived from focusing on recent performance can be value destroying if the new equity 
issues are overvalued. In this thesis, I document that both the operating performance and stock returns 
performance of SEO issuer differs from their peer companies in the Nordic countries between 2005 
and 2015, but the underperformance phenomenon has very different implications. I study SEOs 
conducted in Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland. 
 By examining a sample of 404 SEOs, the peer companies of the issuers and stock market 
returns, I address 1) the operating performance of the issuing firms compared to their peers, 2) the 
subsequent market-adjusted stock market returns, 3) differences in patterns between small and large 
issuers, 4) the existence of an individual issuer effect in stock returns once the company growth is 
taken into account. I reflect my results on the ones of prior studies on similar topics, which are mostly 
conducted during the 1990’s focusing on the U.S. markets of the preceding decade. The obvious 
differences between the sample periods and geographic locations form an interesting point of view 
into the research topic. The equity markets have experienced significant transformations during the 
last 20 years and my topic has not received considerable attention since the turn of the century. 
 My results are varying. The firms conducting SEOs consistently underperform their 
peers in operative measures around the issue year. The issuers display deteriorating performance 
before the issue and do not recover notably afterwards. The median profit margin is 3.84 percent three 
years before the issue, 2.07 in the beginning of the issue year and 2.93 percent three years after the 
issue. During the same period, the peer companies have 1.5 percentage points higher margins. This 
pattern is repeated when inspecting returns on assets or earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation 
and amortization (EBITDA) divided by revenues. The underperformance is more pronounced for 
smaller issuers that also have worse performance overall. At the same time, the issuers have higher 
market capitalizations relative to the book value of equity than their peers throughout the seven-year 
analysis period centered on the issue. 
 Over half of the sample is concentrated on years 2009-2011 and I examine this period 
separately while comparing the median operating performance measures of the issuers and their peers 
to the rest of the sample. The pre-issue deterioration in performance, which is seen in the complete 
sample of 404 SEOs, is substantial amongst the companies conducting SEOs during 2009-2011, while 
the other half of the issuer sample shows steady pre-issue performance. This indicates that the 
financial crisis affected the SEO market by possibly motivating offerings through necessity as capital 
markets slowed down and the operating environment worsened. 
 Interestingly, a slight post-issue improvement in operating performance measures can 
be seen across the issuers, but this is not reflected on the stock returns. On the contrary, the mean 1-
year pre-issue stock returns are 22 percent while the first post-issue year produces mean stock returns 
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of 3.8 percent. Investors could to underreact to news about recent operating performance and 
emphasize other factors in their decision making. 
 I find that, unlike previous studies, my sample does not indicate a clear relation between 
high company growth and low stock returns. A large portion of the issuers are fast-growing firms and 
the companies that have the fastest pre-issue revenue growth, perform inconsistently and generally 
poorly compared to companies with lower growth. A consistent growth effect on stock returns is not 
found, but at the same time, a negative and significant individual issuer effect is present in the sample. 
2. Literature Review 
 
The stock returns of companies issuing equity, both in seasoned equity offerings and initial public 
offerings (IPOs), increasingly caught the attention of researchers in the beginning of the 1990’s. The 
previous decade provided a boom in SEOs and IPOs during 1982 and 1983, thanks to the strong bull 
market and resulting high valuations in the United States. The issuing activity was cyclical and 
opportunistic raising questions about the sensibility of these booms and their implications on both 
stock returns and operating performance of the issuing companies. The financial research community 
took the task to study the consequences. 
 Jay Ritter published a study in 1991 concerning the long-run underperformance of 
common stock subsequent to IPOs and documented weak performance compared to non-issuing peers 
during the three years following the issue. Other studies by Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), Loughran 
and Ritter (1994), and Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) confirmed this underperformance while 
digging deeper into the possible reasons behind the phenomenon and expanding the scope outside the 
U.S. market. Ritter speculates that the poor aftermarket performance is due to firms acting on 
‘windows of opportunity’ surfacing at the peak of industry trends. This requires investors overvaluing 
stocks in specific industries. The study began a series of studies on similar topics. However, at this 
point the research was more limited to the stock returns and investigating the aftermath of the issue 
trends, leaving the operating performance to a side role. 
 Healy and Palepu (1990) found that SEO announcements do not convey information 
about future stock returns. They examine 93 industrial companies from the U.S. during 1966-1981 
and find no significant earnings underperformance compared to the pre-issue numbers or the industry 
medians. They begin a sequence of studies on SEOs with the later ones having contradicting results 
due to differing sample periods and research methods. 
 Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) built on the earlier studies and focused their research 
on the long-run underperformance of stock returns following SEOs. While comparing their findings 
from SEOs conducted in the U.S. between 1975 and 1989, to post-IPO underperformance research, 
they find striking similarities. They conclude that the underperformance phenomenon is not exclusive 
to IPOs while comparing the issuing firms to matching companies. They argue that the post-SEO 
underperformance is caused by information asymmetry between the management and new 
shareholders. Once again, the underlying operating performance and possible earnings management 
are only briefly discussed. 
 Kinnunen, Keloharju, Kasanen and Niskanen (2000) provide a Nordic insight to the 
underperformance of firms conducting SEOs in their study Earnings management and expected 
dividend increases around seasoned share issues: evidence from Finland. This study provides 
evidence that higher discounts on newly issued shares lead to larger expected dividend increases. The 
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issuing companies manage their earnings to report higher earnings in excess of their current 
dividends. The researchers argue that their study indicates a connection between earnings 
management and SEOs to strengthen the perception of the company’s quality before the issue. While 
dividend policies are not the main focus of my thesis, this study is still relevant concerning the 
underlying reasons for the operating performance patterns inside companies conducting SEOs as it 
takes a deeper look into the earnings performance of the issuing firms. It also links the Finnish capital 
markets to the international post-SEO underperformance phenomenon. 
 Siew Hong Teoh, Ivo Welch and T.J. Wong (1998) examine an earnings management 
hypothesis behind the underperformance of firms conducting SEOs and report consistent results from 
1979 to 1989 backing the hypothesis. High pre-issue net income growth powered by accounting 
adjustments (accruals) is followed by a return to the normal after the issue, resulting in deteriorating 
performance on paper. Overly optimistic investors misinterpret the high pre-issue net income as good 
performance. The issuing companies outperform their peers clearly on the issue year but fall behind 
immediately afterwards due to the unsustainable net income levels. They study the actual cash flows 
of the issuing companies to determine that they are significantly lower than industry medians. The 
findings include that discretionary current accruals predict disappointing post-issue stock returns. The 
study concludes that the earning management hypothesis has strong evidence and in a way concludes 
the succession of research on the topic. 
The most relevant study concerning my thesis was published in 1997 by Tim Loughran 
and Jay Ritter. Their article, The Operating Performance of Firms Conducting Seasoned Equity 
Offerings, again studies the performance of issuing firms compared to matched peer companies. The 
most interesting aspect of the study is the width of performance measures used. They take into account 
a wide array of operating performance measures outside earnings and connect their developments 
around the issue year to the stock returns. This study shows significant proof of earnings management 
preceding the SEOs in the United States between 1979 and 1989. In line with other research on the 
topic, in their sample the performance of issuing companies immediately deteriorates quickly after 
the SEO and the phenomenon is found using a variety of measures. The study served as the epitome 
of research done by Loughran and Ritter on similar topics and I follow their methodology in my 
thesis. 
The research activity on the underperformance of companies conducting SEOs fizzled 
out after the two aforementioned studies published in 1997-1998 and the last 20 years have seen 
significantly less research on the phenomenon internationally. My thesis is meant to apply the earlier 
research methods to the modern Nordic market conditions. The 1980’s U.S. equity markets largely 
differs from the ones of North Europe during a time of significant market turbulence. If the earnings 
management and high valuations motivated the SEOs during the eighties, the Nordic SEO boom 
between 2009 and 2011 could have been triggered by financial distress. Because of these apparent 
differences, I find my research question interesting and as I document, the underperformance 
phenomenon has very different implications in my sample. To take a broad look at the reasons behind 
conducting SEOs in my sample companies, I chose to apply most of the measures used by Loughran 
and Ritter (1997) to sufficiently compare the performance of the companies. 
 
 
The Operating Performance of Companies Conducting Seasoned Equity Offerings: Evidence from the Nordics 
 
 7 
3. Data 
 
The SEO data used in this study consists of all the SEOs conducted in Nasdaq Stockholm, Nasdaq 
Copenhagen, Oslo Børs and Nasdaq Helsinki between 2005 and 2015. Early 2000s are excluded as a 
survivorship bias is present in the data available on Refinitiv Eikon (less data available for delisted 
companies) and the performance data from the early 2000’s is varying in coverage. This data includes 
a total of 1450 SEOs. Following the example of many previous studies on operating performance and 
equity issues, I exclude financial institutions from the sample. This removes 87 SEOs. Cornett and 
Tehranian (1994) provide insights to market reactions to involuntary bank offerings while the high 
leverage of financial institutions also distorts accounting ratios. The SEO data is derived from 
Refinitiv Eikon. 
  
3.1. Restrictions for the Sample Companies 
 
Several restrictions are implied for the sample. The issuing firms need to be present on Refinitiv’s 
database with data concerning the issue size, type and date. I only include issues that are cash offers 
of common stock to exclude equity issues that are not targeted to the public. As the study is about 
operational performance over multiple years, I follow the methodology of Loughran and Ritter (1997) 
as well as Healy and Palepu (1990) and exclude all SEOs conducted by the same company during the 
four years after another SEO that is in my sample. This is done to reduce the dependence of the 
statistical test as the operational performance is studied for three fiscal years preceding and following 
the fiscal year of the issue. This further removes 730 SEOs. 
 The issuing firms also have to have total assets of at least $20 million in the end of the 
fiscal year of the issue. The values are measured according to 2019 purchasing power. 195 SEOs are 
removed because of this. The only other restriction is that data concerning sales, net income, stock 
returns and assets needs to be available on Refinitiv Eikon for the fiscal year of the issue. The 
restriction is not applied for other years around the issue. This excludes 34 SEOs from the data and 
404 SEOs are left in the sample. 
 Table 1 reports the issues by calendar year, general industries of the issuing companies 
(defined by two-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) codes), and exchange where the issuing 
company is listed. 51 percent of the sample is concentrated on the three years following the financial 
crisis (2009-2011). This activity is could be explained by the challenging operating environment and 
the resulting shortage of capital during the period. According to the pecking order theory (Myers & 
Majluf, 1984) this would be logical as the availability of debt and firms’ capacity to carry it are limited 
during an economic crisis. After 2011 the activity reduces sharply. 
 
3.2. Benchmark Companies 
 
To evaluate the operating performance of the issuing companies, a benchmark is needed to ensure 
that the documented phenomena are not just a product of the overall market or industry conditions. 
Each issuing firm is matched with a non-issuing firm. This match is based on industry, asset size and 
operating performance. This method takes into account industry characteristics, company lifecycle 
and size to provide a fair starting point for the evaluation of operating performance. 
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 Following the algorithm of Loughran and Ritter (1997) and the inspiration behind their 
method, Barber and Lyon (1996), the possible matches have to be listed on one of the same exchanges 
as my sample companies: Nasdaq Stockholm, Helsinki, Copenhagen or Oslo Børs. The companies 
cannot have issued equity during the four years preceding the sample company’s SEO date. Their 
operating performance has to be available on Refinitiv Eikon for the issue year. 
 
Table 1: Number of Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) by Issue Year, Industry and Exchange 
of Listing between 2000 and 2015 
The sample includes 404 SEOs issued in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland between 2005 and 2015. Financial 
institutions (The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 6000-6299), offerings issued within four years after an 
earlier one by the same company, offerings by companies with assets under $20 million (2019 purchasing power) at the 
end of the issue year and companies with lacking performance data for issue year are excluded from the sample. Industrial 
classification is based on a two-digit SIC code. 
 
 
  
Year Number of Offerings Percentage of Sample
2005 9 2 %
2006 9 2 %
2007 13 3 %
2008 25 6 %
2009 58 14 %
2010 63 16 %
2011 84 21 %
2012 29 7 %
2013 38 9 %
2014 35 9 %
2015 41 10 %
Total 404 100 %
Industry Two-Digit SIC code Number of Offerings
Oil & Gas Extraction 13 24
General Building Contractors 15 9
Food & Kindred Products 20 13
Paper & Allied Products 26 12
Chemical & Allied Products 28 37
Industrial Machinery & Equipment 35 21
Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 36 24
Instruments & Related Products 38 11
Water Transportation 44 35
Real Estate 65 20
Holding & Other Investment Offices 67 27
Business Services 73 48
Engineering & Management Services 87 20
Other 103
Exchange Number of Offerings Percentage of Sample
Stockholm 141 35 %
Copenhagen 54 13 %
Helsinki 70 17 %
Oslo 139 34 %
Panel A: Number of SEOs by Calender Year
Panel B: Number of SEOs by Industrial Classification
Panel C: Number of SEOs by Exchange of Listing of the Issuing Firm
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Companies with total assets size between 25 and 200 percent of the sample company 
(the $20 million limit in asset size is also applied) are then picked from the same industry (defined 
by two-digit SIC codes). The company with the closest normalized earnings before depreciations and 
amortization, interest and taxes (EBITDA) to total assets ratio is then chosen as the matching firm. 
 If no such companies are found within the same industry, a matching firm is then picked 
from the non-issuing sample with total assets between 90 and 110 percent of the issuing company. 
The one with the closest EBITDA/Total Assets ratio is chosen. 
4. Time-series Patterns 
 
4.1. Performance Measures and Median Operational Ratios 
 
Accounting ratios are often skewed and median operating performance are often reported in literature 
because of that*.Table 2 documents the median operating performance measures for issuers and non-
issuers. The reported measures are normalized earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) divided by total assets, return on assets (net income including extraordinary 
items/total assets), profit margin (net income including extraordinary items/total revenue), 
normalized earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total revenue, normalized EBITDA 
divided by total revenue and market capitalization to book value of equity. 
 Table 2 reports the issuer median measures, non-issuer median ratios and the Z-statistics 
testing the yearly equality of distributions as well as the equality of distributions between the change 
in ratios from year 0 to year +3 between the two samples using the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-
Ranks test. 
 The issuer medians on Panel A show a pattern where the measures deteriorate until the 
year of the issue. An upwards bump is seen during the issue year and the one following it, but the 
measures decline soon after during years +2 and +3. This pattern combined with the issues 
concentrating on years with challenging business environment could indicate that in my sample, the 
companies experience a deteriorating financial situation and issue equity out of necessity because of 
the sluggish capital markets. The stable market-to-book ratios combined with falling performance 
ratios could also result in a compelling situation to do so. 
Panel B documents the non-issuers experiencing a similar drop in median measures 
during the same time period, but with smaller effects. The starting point for the measures is higher 
and they do not deteriorate as quickly. They also recover slightly during years 0 and +1, but do not 
start to decline after that. This could indicate a stronger base performance for the non-issuing firms 
that also carries them after the market recovers. Interestingly, the median market-to-book ratios are 
lower than they are for the issuing firms. This supports the theory conserning valuation levels 
affecting the will to issue equity. 
 
  
 
 
 
*For example Kaplan (1989), Healy and Palepu (1990), Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997), and Loughran and Ritter 
(1997) report median values. 
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Table 2: Median Operating Performance Measures for Firms Conducting Seasoned Equity 
Offerings and their Peer Companies 
Panel A reports median measures for 404 issuing firms that are present on Refinitiv Eikon for their issuing year. Panel B 
reports the same measures for matching firms. The match is determined as follows: i) companies with assets between 25 
and 200 percent of the sample company from the same industry (defined by two-digit SIC codes) are picked and the 
company with the closest earnings before depreciations and amortization, interest and taxes (EBITDA) to total assets 
ratio is then chosen as the matching firm or ii) if no companies with the specified asset size are found within the industry, 
the one with the closest EBITDA/assets ratio is picked from the non-issuing sample with assets between 90 and 110 
percent of the issuing company. The reported median measures are return on assets (net income including extraordinary 
items/total assets), profit margin (net income including extraordinary items/total revenue), normalized earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total revenue, normalized earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) divided by total revenue and market capitalization to book value of equity. These median values 
are reported for seven fiscal years around the equity offering with the issue year being year 0. The Z-statistics test the 
equality of distributions for matched pairs of observations using the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test 
 
 
 
 
  
Fiscal Year 
relative to 
offering
EBITDA/ 
Assets ROA
Profit 
margin EBIT/Sales
EBITDA/ 
Sales
Market/ 
Book # of Firms
-3 9.23 3.52 3.89 6.48 10.65 1.56 384
-2 8.60 2.59 2.84 6.44 10.80 1.39 398
-1 7.23 1.66 2.07 5.44 10.27 1.50 402
0 7.73 2.47 2.84 5.39 10.67 1.46 404
1 9.01 2.83 3.17 6.44 11.26 1.48 404
2 7.92 2.63 3.32 6.16 10.27 1.44 404
3 7.51 2.14 2.93 5.76 10.20 1.53 403
-3 9.69 4.18 4.36 6.57 10.84 1.31 366
-2 9.28 3.82 4.19 7.03 10.74 1.30 379
-1 8.55 3.64 3.82 6.51 9.98 1.16 404
0 8.30 3.71 4.38 6.92 10.55 1.29 404
1 8.61 3.74 4.03 7.00 10.96 1.28 404
2 9.00 3.98 4.19 7.43 12.01 1.32 404
3 8.74 3.73 4.31 7.52 11.55 1.37 404
-3 -1.54 -2.14 * -2.42 ** -2.33 ** -2.55 ** 1.60 349
-2 -1.77 * -2.76 ** -2.81 ** -2.74 ** -1.77 * 1.35 375
-1 -1.48 -4.01 *** -3.47 *** -2.82 ** -2.20 * 4.46 *** 402
0 -2.46 ** -4.19 *** -3.03 ** -3.57 *** -2.65 ** 4.36 *** 404
1 -1.11 -2.68 ** -2.01 * -1.99 * -2.05 3.09 *** 404
2 -1.99 * -3.85 *** -3.37 *** -3.43 *** -2.62 ** 2.34 ** 404
3 -2.80 ** -3.74 *** -2.59 ** -2.65 ** -1.96 * 1.85 * 403
Time period
EBITDA/ 
Assets ROA
Profit 
margin EBIT/Sales
EBITDA/ 
Sales
Market/ 
Book # of Firms
Year 0 to +3 -1.02 0.18 0.11 -0.28 -0.29 -3.08 ** 403
Panel D: Z-Statistics Testing the  Equality of Distributions Between the Change in Ratios from Year 0 to Year +3 using the 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test
Panel A: Issuer Medians
Panel B: Non-issuers Medians
Panel C: Z-Statistics Testing the Yearly Equality of Distributions Between the SEOs and Matching Nonissuers using the 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test
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After the seven year period the non-issuing firms have around 1.5 percentage points 
higher median operating performance measures despite having lower median market-to-book ratios. 
Overall, these changes during the event period and the differences between the issuers and non-issuers 
are more muted than those of Loughran’s and Ritter’s (1997) similar study from the 1980’s United 
States and the issuing companies’ strong performance preceding the issue cannot be detected. This 
could be due to the characteristics of my time period and the sample issues concentrating on years 
2009-2011. The Nordic markets saw deteriorating performance throughout thanks to the financial 
crisis and the turbulence continued after a short recovery as the euro crisis began. I will examine the 
SEOs conducted during the financial crisis later in more detail. 
 Figure 1 plots the profit margin medians from Table 2 for the issuing and non-issuing 
firms as well as the market-to-book ratios. Three years preceding and following the issue year are 
included. This illustrates the sharply deteriorating profit margins for the issuers while the market-to-
book ratios remain stable. The difference between the two samples in terms of the relationship 
between profit margins and market-to-book ratios is apparent. 
To measure statistical significance between the two samples, I compute Z-statistics to 
perform a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests of the hypothesis that the distribution of issuer 
and non-issuer ratios are identical. The difference in operating performance ratio between issuer i and 
its matching firm be denoted by 
 
𝑑𝑖  =  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 (𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖) –  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 (𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖) 
 
I then rank the absolute values of di from lowest to highest (for year 0, n = 404). The ranks of the 
positive values of di are summed, with this sum denoted as D. The Z-statistics are computed as 
follows: 
 
𝑍 =  
𝐷 − 𝐸(𝐷)
𝜎𝐷
 
 
𝐸(𝐷) =  
𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
4
 
 
𝜎𝐷
2 =  
𝑛(𝑛 + 1)(2𝑛 + 1)
24
 
 
 
 
If the null hypothesis of equal distribution holds, profitability ratios are drawn from the same 
distribution and the Z-statistics should follow a normal distribution. These Z-statistics are reported in 
Panel C of Table 2.  
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Figure 1. Profit margins and market capitalization/book value of equity for the median issuer 
and non-issuer. 
Median ratios for 404 firms conducting SEOs and their matching peer companies. The match is determined by industry, 
asset size and normalized earnings before depreciations and amortization, interest and taxes (EBITDA) to assets ratio. 
The median values are reported for seven fiscal years around the equity offering with the issue year being year 0.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Table 2 we can see the domination of the non-issuing companies in the performance 
measures. EBITDA to assets is the measure with the smallest difference as it was the measure used 
to pick the matching firms. The differences between the two samples are statistically significant 
measured by ROA, profit margin, EBIT margin and EBITDA margin. The gap is widest before and 
after the issue at years -1 and 0 once again signaling that the sample offers are issued during 
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profitability pressures. The difference in market-to-book ratios is also significant starting from year -
1 for the advantage of the issuing companies supporting the hypothesis of high valuation leading to 
willingness to issue equity. This difference starts to fizzle out after the issue. 
 Panel D reports the Z-statistics testing the equality of distributions between the changes 
in measures from year 0 to year +3 using the same Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks test. The 
results concerning the profitability measures are not significant and they vary across the board, but 
the tightening gap between the market-to-book measures of the issuing and non-issuing companies 
can be clearly seen. The lack of consistent differences in the changes in ratios signal that issuing 
companies are already in distress compared to their non-issuing peers and the fact does not change 
during the years following the issue. 
 While I report median values in this thesis, similar results are found in the aggregate 
data as well. Stable revenues and growing assets are unmatched by the deteriorating net income. 
Especially assets, but also revenues, experience strong growth before the issue while net income falls. 
Similar patterns can be found with mean measures. 
 
4.2. Operating Performance Categorized by Asset-Size Quartiles 
 
To further analyze the median measures and the consistency of the underperformance in the SEO 
sample, I examine the issuing firms categorized by their assets in fiscal year 0 relative to the issue 
(measured by 2019 purchasing power). The sample is split into four quartiles with the cutoffs being 
at $113.2 million, $315 million and $1,445 million of total assets. I report the median EBITDA/assets 
in Panel A and the median profit margins in Panel B for issuers and non-issuers for each of the asset 
size quartiles across the seven fiscal year period centered on the year of the offering. 
 Measured by the EBITDA/assets ratio, the companies with the smallest assets perform 
significantly worse than their peers during the whole seven year period with harsh performance 
deterioration before the issue. From year +1 they recover, but interestingly their peers experience the 
same bump and outperform them clearly. Non-issuing small companies do not see their 
EBITDA/asset measure deteriorating before the issue year. This supports the hypothesis that the 
SEOs are partly motivated by financial distress. The changes in ratios between year 0 and year +3 are 
not statistically significant due to the brief recovery of the issuing firms after the SEO. 
 The performance of the second smallest issuing quartile is dramatically stronger 
compared to the smallest one. Here the measures of the issuers and their peers move closely together 
until the years +2 and +3 where the issuers start falling behind with the results having statistical 
significance in the third year as well as in the comparison between changes in ratios between years 0 
and +3. A striking gap of 7.91 percentage points differentiates the median EBITDA/assets of the 
smallest issuers from the same median measure of the second quartile. The deterioration of the median 
measure is also much more muted preceding the issue year. This could indicate different underlying 
motivations behind the SEO between the smallest and lower-mid-sized companies. 
 Surprisingly the second largest issuer quartile has very similar measures compared to 
the non-issuers. The median measures are close to the ones of the third largest quartile, but this time 
the performance of the issuers does not fall behind from the non-issuers. The largest companies 
perform with similar patterns as the second and third largest quartiles, while showing 
underperformance during years +1, +2 and +3. 
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 Panel B documents the median profit margins and they seem to follow the pattern seen 
in the EBITDA/assets measures, but with more notable underperformance of the issuers. Largest 
companies also gain an advantage when compared to the second and third largest quartiles. Overall 
the median profit margins rise along with the asset size in the samples. This difference between the 
EBITDA/assets and profit margin ratios could be a result from differing balance sheet structures 
between small and large companies as depreciation, amortization, interest and taxes are taken into 
account in the latter measure. The median profit margin for smallest companies on the fiscal year of 
the issue is a shockingly low – 8.24 percentages. The smallest companies underperformed their peers 
that already had poor performance compared to larger companies. Also notable is the profit margin 
underperformance of the issuing large companies compared to their peers; where the difference was 
not statistically significant with EBITDA/assets measures, the profit margins of the issuers are lower 
with statistical significance on years -2, -1 and +3. 
 In previous studies on the same topic, most notably in the one conducted by Loughran 
and Ritter (1997), the smallest issuers have outperformed their peers before the issue and all quartiles 
underperformed their non-issuing peers afterwards. All issuing quartiles also showed higher profit 
margins than their peers during years -1 and 0 with statistical significance. My results do not align 
with earlier research concentrated on the 1980’s and this seems to indicate that the conditions where 
my sample SEOs were conducted are in fact very different. 
Although the median operating performance ratios are widely used both by Loughran 
and Ritter (1997) as well as in the literature in general, the two aforementioned researchers point out 
that using the median measures has conceptual problems concerning covariance between size and 
profitability that cannot be ignored. A highly profitable growth firm can offset the negative effect of 
many smaller firms when looking at market returns or macro-economic changes. Because of this, the 
median measures do not capture the performance of the market as a whole. To tackle this problem to 
some extent, Table 4 documents the aggregate numerators divided by the aggregate denominators for 
the performance measures used earlier. By following the example of Loughran and Ritter (1997), I 
continue to categorize the sample companies by asset size to limit the dominating effects of singular 
large companies. As significance levels are difficult to compute for these performance measures, they 
are left out. 
The measures are calculated as follows: for example, the portfolio profit margin of the 
smallest quartile on year -3, -4.22 percent, is derived from the sum of the net incomes of 101 sample 
companies divided by the sum of their total revenues. Panel A reports the ratios for the issuing 
companies and Panel B reports them for the matching non-issuing companies. 
 The results are clear. Issuing companies underperform their peers across the board in 
all quartiles. However, the difference in performance measures becomes smaller the bigger the 
companies get. This is in line with the median results, but here the effect is more consistent. The 
largest two quartiles of issuers even outperform their peers in post-issue EBITDA/assets ratios. In 
addition to the tightening gap in performance measures, the measures also become significantly 
higher as the companies grow. The smallest issuers experience the harshest pre-issue deterioration 
while having alarming ratios already on year -3. Their peers do not show profitable numbers either. 
Tables 3 and 4 show similar results supporting the qualitative conclusions. 
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Table 3. Median Operating Ratios for Issuer and Matching Non-issuer Firms Categorized by 
Asset Size Quartiles, for 404 Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) from 2005-2015 
Assets (dollars, measured in 2019 purchasing power) are measured at the end of the fiscal year of the offering and 
companies are assigned into quartiles. Matching companies are assigned to the issuers and the match is determined by 
industry, asset size and normalized earnings before depreciations and amortization, interest and taxes (EBITDA) divided 
by assets measure. The median values are reported for seven fiscal years around the equity offering with the issue year 
being year 0. The reported measures are median EBITDA/assets and profit margin (net income including extraordinary 
items/total revenue). The Z-statistics test the equality of distributions for matched pairs of observations using the 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test. 
 
 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 0 to +3
First Quartile: Total Post Issue Assets Between $20 Million and $113.2 Million
Issuers 2.78 1.69 -0.49 0.70 4.78 3.65 5.19
Nonissuers 3.27 4.03 4.79 3.75 5.42 6.96 6.54
Z-stat -1.66* -2.14* -2.33** -3.38*** -2.35** -3.13*** -1.55 0.30
Second Quartile: Total Post Issue Assets Between $113,2 Million and $315 Million
Issuers 9.40 8.83 8.96 8.61 9.50 9.18 7.84
Nonissuers 9.71 9.87 9.04 8.50 9.49 10.02 8.75
Z-stat -0.03 -1.48 -0.19 -0.90 0.13 -1.05 -2.59** -1.70*
Third Quartile: Total Post Issue Assets Between $315 Million and $1,445 Million
Issuers 9.28 9.51 7.91 8.03 9.63 8.91 8.35
Nonissuers 10.72 9.16 7.92 8.41 8.72 8.46 9.00
Z-stat -0.77 0.81 0.94 -0.12 1.89* 1.72* 0.54 0.58
Fourth Quartile: Total Post Issue Assets between $1,445 Million and $69 Billion
Issuers 10.45 11.47 9.73 9.88 9.64 8.74 8.81
Nonissuers 10.47 10.73 9.93 9.73 9.90 10.12 9.89
Z-stat -0.60 -0.35 -0.92 -0.24 -1.54 -0.75 -2.14** -1.60
First Quartile: Total Post Issue Assets Between $20 Million and $113.2 Million
Issuers -1.28 -3.48 -6.90 -8.24 -1.89 -2.64 -0.42
Nonissuers 0.94 1.20 1.77 0.14 1.80 1.76 0.00
Z-stat -1.56 -1.29 -2.59** -2.47** -1.49 -2.37** -0.76 1.17
Second Quartile: Total Post Issue Assets Between $113,2 Million and $315 Million
Issuers 4.15 2.60 2.83 2.27 2.76 3.04 2.77
Nonissuers 4.46 4.31 3.34 4.51 4.12 4.37 5.02
Z-stat 0.12 -1.61 -0.49 -2.15* -0.80 -3.01** -1.81* -0.55
Third Quartile: Total Post Issue Assets Between $315 Million and $1,445 Million
Issuers 4.08 3.57 2.57 4.75 5.53 4.59 3.90
Nonissuers 5.68 4.10 3.93 5.40 3.86 4.63 4.59
Z-stat -2.75** -0.75 -0.83 -0.55 -0.26 -0.14 -0.40 0.07
Fourth Quartile: Total Post Issue Assets between $1,445 Million and $69 Billion
Issuers 6.17 6.20 6.06 5.33 6.46 6.08 4.49
Nonissuers 6.70 6.92 7.94 6.40 7.64 6.57 6.54
Z-stat -0.82 -2.07* -2.97** -0.74 -1.52 -1.32 -2.36** -0.74
Fiscal year relative to issuing
Panel A: Median EBITDA/Assets for the Seven Fiscal Years Centered on the Year of Issuing
Panel B: Median Profit Margins for the Seven Fiscal Years Centered on the Year of Issuing
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Table 4. Operating Performance Measures for Issuers and Their Matching Firms Categorized 
by Asset Size Quartiles, with Performance Measures Calculated as the Portfolio Aggregate 
Numerator Divided by the Portfolio Aggregate Denominator, for 404 Seasoned Equity 
Offerings (SEOs) from 2005-2015 
Total assets are measured (in dollars of 2019 purchasing power) at the end of the fiscal year during which the SEO 
occurred. Companies are then ranked and assigned into quartiles. The reported measures are profit margin (net income 
including extraordinary items/total revenue), return on assets (net income including extraordinary items/total assets) and 
normalized earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to assets. Panel A reports the 
portfolio measures for the issuing firms and Panel B reports them for matching firms (the match is determined by industry, 
asset size and EBITDA/assets ratio). 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal Year 
Related to the 
Offering N Profit Margin ROA
EBITDA/ 
Assets Profit Margin ROA
EBITDA/ 
Assets
First Quartile: Total Post Issue Assets Between $20 Million and $113.2 Million
-3 94 -4.42 -4.15 2.77 -2.86 -2.64 2.33
-2 100 -7.04 -6.45 0.18 -2.09 -2.09 3.15
-1 101 -13.63 -12.18 -3.50 -1.62 -1.55 3.17
0 101 -14.45 -12.93 -1.87 -3.19 -3.06 2.75
1 101 -6.43 -5.87 0.84 -0.98 -1.00 5.06
2 101 -8.45 -7.62 -0.41 0.64 0.66 6.85
3 101 -3.41 -2.85 3.52 1.05 1.07 5.99
Second Quartile: Total Post Issue Assets Between $113.2 Million and $315 Million
-3 99 2.97 2.83 9.26 3.43 3.05 8.81
-2 100 -0.04 -0.04 7.27 3.54 3.29 9.15
-1 100 0.37 0.35 7.90 3.28 2.98 8.89
0 101 0.91 0.85 8.57 4.30 3.87 9.64
1 101 1.69 1.50 8.24 4.19 3.60 9.43
2 101 2.05 1.81 8.98 4.79 4.24 10.07
3 101 3.09 2.72 8.11 3.71 3.24 10.18
Third Quartile: Total Post Issue Assets Between $315 Million and $1,445 Million
-3 93 2.91 2.41 9.18 5.85 4.82 9.54
-2 99 3.51 2.76 9.94 4.76 3.83 9.48
-1 101 1.05 0.80 7.84 2.42 1.90 9.35
0 101 3.80 2.85 8.42 6.00 4.57 9.12
1 101 5.69 3.95 9.38 6.28 4.52 8.88
2 101 6.34 4.31 10.16 5.36 3.95 9.30
3 101 4.96 3.12 9.39 4.62 3.49 9.43
Fourth Quartile: Total Post Issue Assets between $1,445 Million and $69 Billion
-3 98 7.00 5.25 12.90 7.59 4.44 9.45
-2 99 6.68 4.81 12.43 7.95 4.47 8.89
-1 100 5.53 3.84 11.92 7.93 4.24 8.99
0 101 6.04 3.92 10.87 7.96 4.21 8.97
1 101 6.09 4.04 11.98 6.71 3.50 8.52
2 101 5.31 3.44 10.54 7.70 3.46 7.97
3 100 4.82 3.00 9.75 10.01 4.43 7.90
Panel A: Issuing Firms Panel B: Nonissuing firms
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4.3. Pre- and Post-Financial Crisis SEOs Compared to SEOs Conducted during the Crisis 
 
As my sample period of 2005-2015 includes a period of major economic turbulence and over half of 
the 404 issues in the sample are concentrated on years 2009-2011, I document the median 
EBITDA/assets measures and profit margins for the companies conducting their SEOs during these 
years, and for their peers separately in Table 5. The same measures are presented for the companies 
conducting their offers during the other eight years of the sample period. Panel A has the 
EBITDA/assets measures centered on the fiscal year of issuing for the 2009-2011 sample, while Panel 
B documents them for the 2005-2008 and 2012-2015 sample. Panels C and D document the profit 
margins in the same order.  
 Two different patterns can be found in Table 5. The measures for the companies 
conducting SEOs outside the three year period are stable throughout the seven years centered on the 
fiscal year of the issuing, with the profit margins improving slightly before the issue. Despite this, 
both performance measures show lower values compared to the matching non-issuing companies 
with the difference having statistical significance on the issue year. 
 The 205 offerings between 2009 and 2011 tell a different story. Noticeable pre-issue 
performance deterioration can be seen for the issuing companies. The peer companies show similar 
deterioration but with less drastic effects. Both of these groups end up with much worse performance 
measures at year +3 compared to the ones of year -3. Interestingly, the performance ratios for the year 
-3 are much higher for issuers and non-issuers in the 2009-2011 sample compared to the issuing and 
non-issuing firms in the 2005-2008 and 2012-2015 sample. This is probably due to the fact that years 
2005 to 2008 saw very few issues (56) and as a result, the year -3 relative to the issue is between 2009 
and 2011 for most of the offerings in the 2005-2008 and 2012-2015 sample. Thus, these overlapping 
periods coinciding with a difficult economic environment can explain this pattern. 
 Definitive conclusions are hard to draw from the results presented in Table 5, but a 
difference in patterns and performance is clear between the samples from the two time periods. This 
could indicate differing circumstances motivating the SEOs. Dried up capital markets during the 
financial crisis could have influenced the heightened issuing activity in the Nordics between 2009 
and 2011. According to Myers (1984) and his pecking order theory, a limited availability of debt 
financing could result in more equity offerings. Further research would be needed as little recent 
research on public equity offerings can be found to provide insights to the effects of the global 
financial crisis on the issuing activity. 
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Table 5. Median EBITDA/Assets and Profit Margin for Issuers and Matching Non-issuing 
Firms Categorized by Issue Years for 404 SEOs from 2005-2015 
In Panels A and B, EBITDA/Assets is defined as normalized earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
divided by assets. In Panels C and D, profit margin is defined as net income including extraordinary items divided by 
total revenue. The Z-statistics test the equality of distributions for matched pairs of observations using the Wilcoxon 
signed-ranks test. 
 
 
 
5. Operating Performance Changes and Stock Returns 
 
5.1. The Investment Performance of Issuing Firms 
 
This section documents the market-adjusted stock returns of the issuing firms and their matched peer 
companies. The stock returns are mostly calculated for the five years following the fiscal year of the 
issue. Annual arithmetic return on portfolio p is defined as 
 
𝑟𝑝 =  
1
𝑛
 ∑ ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑡
𝑖=1
5
𝑡=1
 
 
where rit is the annual returns on firm i in event-year t, nt is the number of surviving firms in event-
year t, and n is the total number of firm-year observations. Because of this, if return data is available 
in Refinitiv Eikon for the five years following the issue date, full five years are counted and if the 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 0 to +3
SEOs 11.02 10.13 7.31 7.76 9.50 8.06 7.57
Matching 11.37 8.96 8.47 8.80 9.44 9.32 8.92
Z-statistic -0.45 -0.83 -1.01 -1.49 -1.12 -1.70* -2.61** -1.09
SEOs 7.54 7.51 7.23 7.46 8.61 7.55 7.50
Matching 9.17 9.47 8.76 7.85 8.47 8.46 8.47
Z-statistic -1.77* -1.78* -1.13 -1.99* -0.46 -1.12 -1.33 -0.37
SEOs 4.94 2.74 1.36 2.65 2.95 2.75 2.77
Matching 5.71 3.89 3.18 3.86 3.90 3.98 4.02
Z-statistic -1.91* -2.17* -2.35** -2.47** -0.77 -2.04* -2.65** 0.55
SEOs 2.73 3.04 3.66 3.44 3.46 3.91 3.35
Matching 3.28 4.48 4.25 4.56 4.19 4.63 4.66
Z-statistic -1.55 -1.94* -2.56** -1.88* -2.06* -2.68** -1.13 -0.33
Fiscal Year Relative to the Year of Issuing
Panel A: Median EBITDA/Assets for Offerings between 2009 and 2011 (N  = 205)
Panel B: Median EBITDA/Assets for Offerings from Years 2005-2008 and 2012-2015 (N  = 199)
Panel C: Median Profit Margin for Offerings between 2009 and 2011 (N  = 205)
Panel D: Median Profit Margin for Offerings from Years 2005-2008 and 2012-2015 (N  = 199)
The Operating Performance of Companies Conducting Seasoned Equity Offerings: Evidence from the Nordics 
 
 19 
data only covers, for example, 1.5 years due to delisting, two years of annual returns are counted. 
Time is measured in relation to the beginning of the issuing month and as a result, the performance 
measures that are calculated on a fiscal year basis (usually the full calendar year in the Nordics) do 
not correspond directly. When investigating the returns as dependent of sales growth and conducted 
offerings, the annual returns are calculated starting from the beginning of calendar year +1 relative to 
the issue. The average SEO is issued at June so the portfolios are formed an average of six months 
after the offering. Thus, the returns are calculated based on data affected by the investors’ evaluations 
of the issuing companies’ performance after the offering. 
In Table 4, I report the market reaction to the operating performance of the issuing 
companies. Panel A documents the stock returns for the year preceding the offer and the average 
annual return during the five post-issue years. Benchmark index returns are calculated as a value 
weighted average of Nasdaq OMX Helsinki, Nasdaq OMX Copenhagen, Nasdaq OMX Stockholm 
and Oslo Børs total returns over the same post-issue trading days. The values used are based on the 
exchanges of trading and market capitalizations of the issuing companies. The returns of the matched 
peer companies are also reported for the time period. 
The results are consistent with the operating performance ratios. The average annual 
returns crash down to 7.78 percent while the returns for the pre-issue year are 22.08 percent. At the 
same time the index beats the issuing firms clearly with average annual returns of 11.50 percent. This 
is outshined by the matching firms that post annual returns of 13.46 percent during the post-issue 
period. The larger half of the issuing companies once again outperforms the smaller half by a large 
margin both before and after the issue. This pattern does not occur in the matching firms’ portfolio. 
The poor operating performance is thus clearly reflected in returns. 
Panel B of Table 4 documents the average annual returns for each of the post-issue years 
independently. The issuers underperform the market by a large margin during years 1 and 2, market 
adjusted returns are -3.95 percent and -6.79 percent respectively. After that they recover while still 
losing to the index. The non-issuing firms outperform the index due to a few companies having 
massive returns in the sample, even after the best and worst performing 1 percent of the companies 
are excluded. 
These results differ greatly from the ones of Loughran and Ritter (1997). They document 
similar post-issue underperformance of the issuing companies, but with larger margins and higher 
statistical significance. The biggest difference is the high pre-issue returns of the issuers. This once 
again indicates the different market conditions and motivations for SEOs between the two research 
periods and markets. Loughran and Ritter report mean prior annual return on issuers of 93.1 percent 
with mean post-issue annual returns of 9 percent for the same group. 
 
5.2. The Confounding Effect behind the Poor Performance: Does it still Hold Up? 
 
Loughran and Ritter (1997) try to explain the drastic stock performance results of the issuing 
companies with a theory they call the confounding effect. This effect is based on the research 
conducted on stock market overreaction by Dreman (1982) as well as De Bondt and Thaler (1985). 
These researchers apply the findings of psychologists concerning tendencies for humans to 
overweight recent experience while underestimating the importance of long-term averages, including 
Kahneman and Tversky (1982), to the stock market. The tendencies of stock market to over 
extrapolation of recent growth has been found controversial by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 
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(1994) as well as Dechow and Sloan (1997). Loughran and Ritter find the issuing firms to be high 
growth companies with low post-issue stock returns and hence, they proceed to test if there is an 
adverse relationship between these two factors. This is called the confounding effect hypothesis. 
I follow the methodology of Loughran and Ritter in focusing on sales as the growth 
measure. They also include capital expenditure summed with research and development costs as 
another growth measure, but I leave it out of the analysis with the data on Refinitiv Eikon being 
lacking and inconsistent. Sufficient data is available for too few companies to form a clear picture. 
 To test the relation between firm growth and stock returns, I use the following measures 
to examine the market-adjusted returns: the one-year market-adjusted return, the average annual 
geometric market-adjusted return, the average annual arithmetic market-adjusted return and the five-
year buy-and-hold market-adjusted return. 
 
Table 6. Average Annual Returns of Issuers, Matching Non-issuing Firms and the Market 
during the Five Years after Issuing 
In Panel A, the average annual returns are calculated for firms conducting seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) between 
2005 and 2015, meeting the specific criteria used in this thesis. Matching non-issuing firms are chosen based on industry, 
asset size and normalized earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to assets ratio. 1-year 
and 5-year returns are measured from the beginning of the issuing month. Index returns are calculated as a value weighted 
average of Nasdaq OMX Helsinki, Nasdaq OMX Copenhagen, Nasdaq OMX Stockholm and Oslo Børs total returns over 
the same trading days. The weights are based on the market capitalization of the issuing firms and their exchanges of 
trading. In Panel A, the number of firm-years is calculated by summing the number of post-issue event-years of which 
the sample firms’ returns are reported on Refinitive Eikon. For a majority of the firms this is 5 years. Firms in the smallest 
quartile have post-issue assets of $20 to $113.2 million, quartile 2 firms have assets of $113.2 to $315 million, quartile 3 
firms have assets of $315 to $1,445 million and the firms in the largest quartile have assets between $1,445 million and 
$69 billion. In Panel B, average annual returns are reported for the 5 post-issue years. To reduce the bias in the sample, 
top and bottom 1% of the returns are excluded. The t-statistics are calculated assuming independence and normality. 
 
 
  
Asset Portfolio Number of Firms
Mean Prior 
Annual Return on 
Issuers Issuing Firms VW Index Matching Firms
Number of Firm-
Years
Smallest 101 12.00 % 4.98 % 11.74 % 10.79 % 467
2 101 14.90 % 5.18 % 10.77 % 16.11 % 461
3 101 37.11 % 12.93 % 11.66 % 12.73 % 460
Largest 101 26.81 % 8.10 % 11.82 % 14.10 % 443
Total 404 22.08 % 7.78 % 11.50 % 13.46 % 1831
Portfolio Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
SEOs 3.80 % 3.37 % 11.00 % 11.16 % 10.37 %
Index 7.76 % 10.15 % 13.26 % 14.62 % 11.80 %
Matching firms 8.58 % 8.20 % 16.41 % 17.11 % 17.76 %
Market-adjusted -3.95 % -6.79 % -2.27 % -3.45 % -1.43 %
t-statistic (-1.46) (-2.71)** (-0.93) (-1.23) (-0.50)
Matching-firm-adjusted -4.78 % -4.84 % -5.41 % -5.95 % -7.39 %
t-statistic (-1.41) (-1.49) (-1.69) (-1.57) (-2.07)*
Panel A: Average Annual Returns during the Pre- and Post-issue Periods
Mean Postissue Annual Returns
Panel B: Annual Returns by Event-Year for Issuers and the Value-Weighted Index
Post-issue Event Year
The Operating Performance of Companies Conducting Seasoned Equity Offerings: Evidence from the Nordics 
 
 21 
The average annual geometric market-adjusted return on issuing firm i is defined as 
 
𝑟?̅? =  √∏ (1 +  𝑟𝑖𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
−  √∏ (1 +  𝑟𝑚𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
 
 
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the annual return in event-year t on firm i, 𝑟𝑚𝑡 is the market return for that year, and T = 
min(event-year in which delisting occurs, 5). In Tables 7 and 8 I calculate the returns starting from 
the beginning of the calendar year following the fiscal year on which the offering was conducted as 
I use accounting information for the whole issuing year. The growth measure used is sales growth 
rate defined as the year-over-year percentage increase in sales. 
 In the “Proportions” column of the Table 7 a notable concentration in the high sales 
growth categories can be seen. The calculated yearly average returns are partly affected by individual 
companies with extremely high or low returns. Despite this, some patterns can be found. The non-
issuers once again outperform the issuers, but surprisingly in the two highest sales growth categories 
the issuers offer better returns. The returns of the issuing firms seem to fall as the growth accelerates. 
Naturally, negative growth is not rewarded with high returns. According to Lakonishok, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994), on average fast-growing firms underperform the slow-growing firms by a large 
margin when using any of the return metrics I use. 
 The average return metrics for the whole sample reduces the effect of the individual 
companies and these numbers show a consistent 5 percent underperformance of the issuing 
companies in the yearly measures. In buy-and-hold returns the difference is 17.5 percent. The 
reported differences are consistent with the previous research by Loughran and Ritter (1997) and 
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) with not as pronounced effects. The smaller sample also allows 
the individual companies to have a larger impact on the calculated average returns. 
In Table 8, I report the results of panel dataset regressions with cohort year fixed effects. 
The same four measures of market-adjusted returns are used, but this time the dataset includes all 
companies listed on Nasdaq OMX Helsinki, Nasdaq OMX Copenhagen, Nasdaq OMX Stockholm 
and Oslo Børs that are present in Refinitiv Database with positive fiscal year -1 and year 0 sales, with 
at least $20 million in year 0 assets and meeting the other criteria used in this study. All firms that 
issued equity during year -4 to -1 are discarded. The dataset has 5,007 observations. The revenue 
growth measure has no significant impact on the reported market-adjusted returns, but a clear 
negative issuer effect is present with the results having strong statistical significance in both of the 
average annual return measures. These results are not perfectly in line with the results in Table 7 but 
the presence of a negative issuer effect in the data is further solidified. The difference in results 
concerning the sales growth effect could be due to the larger sample being used here. 
 Issuers Nonissuers Issuers Nonissuers Issuers Nonissuers Issuers Nonissuers Issuers Nonissuers
   SG < -20 % 12.31 % 11.81 % -22.01 % -3.78 % -16.83 % -3.04 % -15.10 % 0.00 % -14.35 % 9.19 %
-20 % < SG < -10 % 9.05 % 10.80 % -16.11 % -2.92 % -15.46 % -4.75 % -11.60 % 2.21 % -44.10 % 21.59 %
-10 % < SG < 0 % 17.34 % 20.10 % -4.81 % -0.57 % -7.41 % -2.85 % -2.61 % 0.51 % -4.37 % 21.31 %
0 % < SG < 10 % 20.10 % 22.86 % 1.22 % 8.41 % -2.54 % 1.73 % 2.35 % 5.60 % 9.16 % 40.44 %
10 % < SG < 20 % 11.31 % 10.80 % 0.70 % 1.04 % -7.00 % -2.79 % -1.12 % 0.64 % 23.23 % -3.66 %
20 % < SG < 30 % 6.28 % 7.04 % 0.55 % 5.54 % -7.63 % -5.98 % -3.13 % -0.77 % 5.97 % -14.32 %
30 % < SG < 40 % 4.77 % 3.02 % 4.55 % 29.31 % -10.37 % 2.26 % -2.99 % 8.12 % 11.24 % 93.51 %
40 % < SG < 50 % 3.77 % 3.27 % 21.65 % -9.64 % -3.39 % -5.41 % 3.63 % 5.36 % 4.25 % -12.15 %
50 % < SG  15.33 % 15.33 % 2.97 % -8.10 % -9.02 % -15.73 % -0.85 % -4.14 % 3.19 % -5.72 %
All 100.00 % 100.00 % 3.80 % 8.58 % -8.75 % -3.44 % -3.64 % 1.69 % -0.17 % 17.37 %
Average Percentage Market Adjusted returns
Proportion 1-year Annual geometric Annual arithmetic 5 year buy and hold
Sales group
Panel A: Issuers and Non-issuers Categorized by Sales Growth (SG)
Table 7. Market-adjusted Abnormal Returns for Issuers and Non-issuers, Segmented Growth Rates 
The average annual returns are calculated for firms conducting seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) between 2005 and 2015 meeting the specific criteria used in this thesis. 
Matching non-issuing firms are chosen based on industry, asset size and normalized earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to assets ratio. 
Market returns are calculated as a value weighted average of Nasdaq OMX Helsinki, Nasdaq OMX Copenhagen, Nasdaq OMX Stockholm and Oslo Børs total returns over the 
same trading days. The weights are based on the market capitalization of the issuing firms and their exchanges of trading.1-year and 5-year returns are measured from the 
beginning of the issuing month. For firms that are delisted early, returns are calculated until the delisting year. The annual geometric and annual arithmetic mean returns for a 
firm are calculated over 5 years or in the case of early delisting, until the delisting month. The sample period for issuing is 2005-2015 with the return data continuing until 
October 31, 2019. The percentage sales growth rate is calculated as fiscal year 0 sales minus fiscal year -1 sales, divided by year -1 sales. 
Table 8. Panel Dataset Regressions with Cohort Year Fixed Effects, with Firm Growth and an 
SEO Dummy Variable as Explanatory Variables and Four Measures of Market-Adjusted 
Returns as Dependent Variables 
The sample period for issuing is 2005-2015, with returns continuing until October 31, 2019. On December 31 of each 
year, firms are classified as to whether or not they conducted a seasoned equity offering (SEO) during the prior 12 months. 
All companies listed on Nasdaq OMX Helsinki, Nasdaq OMX Copenhagen, Nasdaq OMX Stockholm and Oslo Børs that 
are present in Refinitiv’s Database with positive fiscal year -1 and year 0 sales, with at least $20 million in year 0 assets 
(measured in 2019 purchasing power), and meeting certain other criteria are used. All firms that issued equity during year 
-4 to - 1 are discarded. The percentage revenue growth rates are calculated as fiscal year 0 revenues minus fiscal year - 1 
revenues, divided by fiscal year -1 revenues. The SEO dummy variable takes on a value of 1 if a firm conducted an SEO 
during the prior 12 months, and 0 otherwise. In each regression, there are 11 cohort year dummy variables. No dummy 
variable is present for cohort year 2015. The sample size is 5,007 observations. Market returns are calculated as a value 
weighted average of Nasdaq OMX Helsinki, Nasdaq OMX Copenhagen, Nasdaq OMX Stockholm and Oslo Børs total 
returns over the same trading days. For firms that are delisted before the end of a holding period, the market-adjusted 
returns are calculated until the beginning of the delisting month. The annual geometric and annual arithmetic mean returns 
for a firm are calculated over the maximum of either five years or, in the case of early de-listings, the number of years 
through which it is delisted. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
𝑟𝑖 −  𝑟𝑚 = ∝1 Revenue Growth𝑖 + ∝2 SEO Dummy𝑖 + ∑ ∝𝑗 Dummy𝑗
2014
𝑗=2005
+ 𝑒𝑖 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
6.1. Summary 
 
This thesis applies the theories used in previous research on the poor operating performance and stock 
returns of companies conducting seasoned equity offerings to the 21st century Nordic markets. The 
sample consists of 404 SEOs issued in Sweden, Norway Denmark and Finland during 2005-2015. 
The results are not perfectly aligned with the prior research done on the subject, which is focused on 
the U.S. markets in the 1980’s. I reflect my findings on the earlier studies, most notably on the article 
The Operating Performance of Firms Conducting Seasoned Equity Offerings by Loughran and Ritter 
(1997). 
Dependent Variable Intercept SEO Dummy Revenue Growth
1-Year 10.34 -5.92 -0.0001
(2.66)** (-0.98) (-0.25)
Annual geometric -9.28 -4.16 -0.00004
(-10.24)*** (-2.72)** (-0.41)
Annual arithmetic -3.12 -6.92 -0.0001
(-1.82) (-2.60)** (-0.43)
5-Year buy-and-hold -10.93 -27.47 -0.0001
(-1.09) (-1.71) (-0.14)
Panel A: Regression Results Using Market-adjusted Returns as the Dependent Variable and Revenue 
Growth, SEO Dummy and Cohort Year Fixed Effects as Explanatory Variables
Parameter Estimates
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 In previous studies, the issuing companies have displayed significant over performance 
preceding the SEO and quickly deteriorating performance immediately afterwards. My findings 
imply that the issuing companies underperform their peers consistently with deteriorating 
performance already before the issue. After a small recovery, they fall behind once again two or three 
years after the issue. For example, the median issuer has a 1.5 percent lower profit margin throughout 
the seven fiscal years centered on the issue compared to the median of non-issuing peers, with the 
ratio deteriorating from 3.89 percent to 2.07 during the two years preceding the issue. During the 
same period, the median non-issuer has stable profit margins of around 4 percent. The smallest issuers 
have the weakest performance on all fronts. 
 As the sample period is coincided with the global financial crisis and over half of the 
sample SEOs are conducted during years 2009-2011, I take a look at the SEOs conducted during 
these years separately and compare them to the rest by inspecting the operating performance measures 
of the issuing companies. The companies conducting offerings between 2009 and 2011 experience 
drastic deterioration of operating performance measures before the issue, while the issuers that carry 
out their offerings outside this period have stable pre-issue performance. 
 The issuers have higher market-to-book multiples on all event-years compared to their 
peers. However, the post-issue stock returns are significantly lower than the ones of their peers or the 
market as a whole. Once again, the smallest issuers have the lowest returns corresponding with their 
poor operating performance while the larger ones also underperform but with smaller margins. 
 The issuing companies are often high growth firms with the share of firms posting a 
pre-issue yearly revenue growth of over 10 percent being 41 percent of the sample. As fast growing 
firms have historically had lower stock returns than low-growth firms, I follow the example of 
Loughran and Ritter (1997) and examine whether the low returns of the issuing firms is due to their 
high growth. A clear connection between growth and returns is not found and the revenue growth 
does not seem to have a consistent adverse effect on returns in my sample. However, a strong 
independent issuer effect is found with the issuers having lower returns than the overall market 
regardless of the growth rate. 
 
6.2. Interpretation and Implications 
 
It appears that the frameworks used in the research around seasoned equity offerings in the 1980’s 
U.S. markets are not directly applicable in the 21st century Nordics. However, it is clear that the firms 
conducting SEOs underperform the overall market and their peers measured with a wide variety of 
operating performance ratios and stock return metrics. 
 The SEOs seem to be motivated by a variety of reasons. As Loughran and Ritter (1997), 
argue, some SEOs can be the result of opportunistic behavior after a stock price run-up, some offers 
can be conducted after systematic earnings management and others may issue equity to fill an urgent 
need of capital. The results of my thesis do not support the earnings management hypothesis that was 
popularized in the 1990’s. Performance of the issuing companies is lower compared to their peers 
years before the issue indicating problems in the company operations. The deterioration of 
performance measures before the issue indicates that if some earnings are pushed back to boost the 
earnings in later years, the timing fails badly. The deterioration is the most drastic when inspecting 
the SEOs conducted between years 2009 and 2011. 
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 The high market-to-book ratios and strong pre-issue stock returns could be interpreted 
as supportive evidence for the opportunistic issuance behavior hypothesis supported by Loughran and 
Ritter (1995). Higher than average valuation multiples and a decent stock price could motivate the 
management to turn to equity issues in times of capital needs if the availability of debt financing is 
limited, even if the market conditions and prior stock returns are not phenomenal. Most of the sample 
offerings are conducted during difficult times and in the case of the smallest issuing companies, the 
operating performance is not only worse than peers, but also alarming overall. In some situations, 
issuing equity could have been the only medium of financing to keep the company alive. As the 
research published on this topic is fairly scarce for the last 20 years, more studies on equity offerings 
issued due to necessity would be needed to strengthen this hypothesis. However, the numbers indicate 
hard times for the issuers: a median profit margin of -8.4 percent on the fiscal year of the issue for 
the smallest issuers cannot be healthy. The capital expenditures of the issuing companies would also 
be an interesting factor to look at to get a better look at the investment decisions behind the capital 
needs. Unfortunately, the data in Refinitiv Eikon from the Nordics is lacking on this front. 
 One result of this thesis is counterintuitive. The slight post-issue improvement in 
operating performance measures of the issuing companies after pre-issue deterioration does not 
correlate positively with the stock returns. Mean 1-year pre-issue stock returns are 22 percent while 
the first post-issue year produces mean stock returns of 3.8 percent. At the same time, the median 
profit margin of the issuers is 2.07 percent for the fiscal year preceding the issue and it improves to 
2.84 percent for the fiscal year of the issue. One could think that these performance numbers would 
affect investor behavior especially as the pre-issue performance is this weak. One possible 
explanation is offered by Savor (2012), who argues that investors underreact to news about 
fundamentals and overreact to other shocks that move stock prices. As most of the sample SEOs are 
conducted during turbulent market conditions and the issue itself is a strong signal concerning the 
stock price, the small improvement in the fundamentals can be overrun by other factors affecting 
behavior. The investors can also postpone their decisions and the SEO can be the final blow after a 
period of weak operating performance, especially if the stock price is still fairly high to begin with, 
as the data suggest based on market-to-book ratios and pre-issue returns. 
 To summarize, the operating underperformance of the companies conducting SEOs is 
rewarded with low post-issue stock returns, but the patterns are incoherent. Further research on 
earnings management could bring light to the underlying factors affecting operating performance as 
Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) show. The characteristics of the market for equity issues during this 
time period could also answer some questions about the motivations behind the SEOs as well as the 
investor behavior. Levis (1995), Cai (1996) and Kand, Kim, and Stulz (1996) provide proof that the 
investment performance of SEOs conducted in United Kingdom and Japan is similar to the ones 
conducted in the United States. It would be interesting to see similar, more recent research on these 
larger markets to evaluate the possible peculiarities of the Nordic markets. Nevertheless, poor 
operating performance and the subsequent low stock returns are once again found, consistent with 
earlier studies. The phenomenon still has important implications on equity markets. 
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